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Casenote
Simply "Too Tenuous"' McCoy v. American
Suzuki Motor Corporation:2 The
Application of the Rescue Doctrine to a
Products Liability Claim
I. Introduction
"The risk of rescue, if not only it be wanton, is born of the occasion.
The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have fore-
seen the coming of a deliverer."3
Justice Cardozo, 1921
Justice Cardozo, in delivering the opinion in the case of
Wagner v. International Railway Co.,4 wrote "[tihe wrong that
imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also
to his rescuer."5 However, consider the following scenario: an
automobile manufacturer is sued for a design defect following
an accident in which an automobile it manufactured hit a patch
of ice, skidded off the road and rolled over.6 The suit is brought
by a person who witnessed the accident and stopped to assist
the injured automobile driver and passenger.7 Upon reviewing
the claim, the manufacturer finds that while returning to his
car, the rescuer was struck by a hit-and-run driver.8 The res-
1. Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1964).
2. 936 P.2d 31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 961 P.2d 952 (Wash. 1998).
3. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921).
4. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
5. Id. at 437.
6. See McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 961 P.2d 952, 955 (Wash.
1998).
7. See id. at 955.
8. See id.
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cuer brings a products liability claim for a design defect by way
of the rescue doctrine.9 Summary judgment is entered in the
manufacturer's favor because the trial judge finds that the al-
leged design defect, if proven was not the proximate cause of the
rescuer's injuries.10 However, the Washington Court of Appeals
reverses the decision and the Washington Supreme Court af-
firms and remands the matter for trial. The court reasons that
the predictability of a rescuer's response to an accident,
whether the accident involves a defective product or otherwise,
creates a question of fact as to whether a predicate defect-re-
lated accident can be the legal cause of a rescuer's injury.1'
Justice Cardozo observed that "[tihe wrong that imperils
life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is also a wrong to his
rescuer."12 Based on this, should the manufacturer be held lia-
ble for remote injuries? Will the manufacturer reconsider re-
leasing a new automobile design out of fear that recognition of a
rescuer-related cause of action will enlarge its liability expo-
sure? The above scenario is not fictitious; it is the case underly-
ing the Washington Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
decisions in McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp.13
In finding the rescue doctrine to be applicable to a products
liability claim, the Washington Supreme Court in McCoy rea-
soned that it is a societal norm that a person will come to the
rescue of another in peril and that when he does, he should not
be barred from bringing suit to recover for injuries causally con-
nected to the product defect. 14 In the court's words
The rescue doctrine is not a common law remedy. Rather, it is
shorthand for the idea that rescuers are to be anticipated and is a
reflection of a societal value judgment that rescuers should not be
barred from bringing suit for knowingly placing themselves in
danger to undertake a rescue.15
However, in affirming the court of appeals decision, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court added that the rescue doctrine does not
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See McCoy, 961 P.2d at 955.
12. Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.
13. 936 P.2d 31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 961 P.2d 952 (Wash. 1998).
14. See McCoy, 961 P.2d at 956.
15. Id.
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vary the ordinary rules of negligence; a plaintiff "must still
show the defendant proximately caused his injuries."16
Although the New York Court of Appeals is somewhat harmoni-
ous with the Washington Supreme Court's application of the
rescue doctrine, its application of the doctrine is slightly more
restrictive by requiring "that something more than a mere sus-
picion of danger to the [life] of another is requisite before the
doctrine should be implemented."17
This Casenote presents the argument that the Washington
Court of Appeals and Washington Supreme Court decisions in
McCoy were erroneous. The courts are in error because the
foreseeability of McCoy's injuries, as in the words of Circuit
Judge Friendly in Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co.,18 was "too
tenuous." 9 Section II of this Casenote will provide a brief his-
tory and development of products liability. Section III will dis-
cuss the rescue doctrine. Section IV will discuss proximate
16. Id. at 956-57.
17. Provenzo v. Sam, 244 N.E.2d 26, 28 (N.Y. 1968).
18. 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). Kinsman involved a ship known as the
MacGilvray Shiras, which broke free due to improper mooring and a build-up of ice
debris. See id. at 712. Once the Shiras broke loose, it collided with the Tewksbury,
causing the Tewksbury to break free. See id. Thereafter, both ships went
downriver together, colliding into the Michigan Avenue bridge, causing the bridge
to collapse. See id. at 713. As a result of the collision, the water and ice began to
back up, causing flooding and property damage. See id. Claims were filed against
the Kinsman Transit Company, which owned the Shiras, the Continental Grain
Company, the owners of the dock in which the Shiras was originally moored, and
the City of Buffalo. See id. at 711, 713. Kinsman's and Continental's liability
arose out of the improper mooring of the Shiras. See Kinsman Transit Co., 338
F.2d at 714-18. The City of Buffalo was found liable for failing to raise the Michi-
gan Avenue Bridge in time to avoid the disaster. See id. at 713. The drawbridge
could have been raised in order to avoid the collision, but was not, because at the
time of the collision the operator on the earlier shift had not returned from a tav-
ern and the incoming bridge controller received the call to raise the bridge too late.
See id. In finding the parties liable, Judge Friendly also noted that "[tihe weight of
authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to consequences foresee-
able at the time of the negligent conduct when the consequences are 'direct,' and
the damage, although other and greater than expectable, is of the same general
sort that was risked." Id. at 724. However, Judge Friendly also noted that there
will come a point when the link between the negligence and the damages will be-
come "too tenuous - that what is claimed to be consequence is only fortuity." Id. at
725. The later point was applied in Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968), when the court held that the damages sustained by owners of wheat, who
were unable to have their shippers deliver their wheat, were too remote or indirect
for liability. See id. at 825.
19. Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d at 725.
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cause, by way of case law and commentary. Sections II, III, and
IV will use New York case law and commentary as a basis for
discussion. Section V will provide a complete review of the his-
tory and holdings of the Washington Court of Appeals and the
Washington Supreme Court as they relate to the case of McCoy
v. American Suzuki Motor Corp.20 Section VI will provide an
analysis of the issue of proximate cause, as it relates to the
products liability claim of Mr. and Mrs. James McCoy ("McCoy")
against American Suzuki Motor Corp. ("Suzuki"), by way of the
rescue doctrine. Section VII will conclude that the reversal of
summary judgment in favor of Suzuki was clearly an error,
since foreseeability of the occurrence was "too tenuous."21
II. A Brief Review Of Products Liability
"If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
thing of danger."22
Justice Cardozo, 1916
Four principal doctrines have shaped modern products lia-
bility law: (1) negligence; (2) breach of warranty; (3) strict lia-
bility; and (4) misrepresentation. 23 The area of products
liability law was established to compensate consumers for inju-
ries sustained from sellers and manufacturers of defective prod-
ucts. 24 Additionally, both the Restatement (Second) of Torts25
("Restatement (Second)") and the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability26 ("Restatement (Third)") continually assist
the courts in shaping the future of the law of products liabil-
ity.27 The Restatement (Third) provides an almost total over-
20. 936 P.2d 31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 961 P.2d 952 (Wash. 1998).
21. Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d at 725.
22. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
23. See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 17.01 [A], at 291
(1996).
24. See id. Originally, for an individual to bring a products liability claim, he
had to be in privity with the manufacturer or seller of the defective products. See
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (Ex. 1842). However, in 1916,
Justice Cardozo removed the requirement of privity as it related to defectively
manufactured goods. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1997).
27. See generally id. at 3-4 (providing a brief review of the history of the
Restatements).
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haul of the Restatement (Second).28 This section is meant
merely as an introduction and not a total review of products
liability.
A. Negligence
A negligence claim in a products liability suit is based upon
a person's failure to exercise due care under the circum-
stances. 29 The person's exercise of due care will be compared
with that of a person "of ordinary prudence"30 in the same or
similar situation. The elements of a negligence claim are
(1) that the seller owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the seller
breached that duty; (3) that the breach of duty was a cause in fact
of the plaintiffs injury; (4) that the cause in fact was a proximate
cause of the injury; and (5) that the harm suffered is recoverable
in negligence.31
A manufacturer may be found at fault for the negligent design,
manufacture or failure to provide adequate warnings or instruc-
tions in providing a product. 32
The opinion of Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Pack-
age Machinery Co., 33 a failed strict liability and negligence
claim,34 provides a look at the New York Court of Appeals' ap-
plication of the above-mentioned elements to a negligence
claim. The Robinson case involved an action brought by an em-
ployee who was injured while operating a plastic molding
machine used to mold plastic beads to a nylon cord.35 The em-
ployer modified the machine to make it better suited for its pur-
poses by cutting a hole through the plexiglass safety gate.3 6 The
28. See id. at 3.
29. See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2:1, at 44 (3d ed. 2000).
30. Id. at § 2:3, at 51. Under the doctrine of negligence, a manufacturer will
be held to the standard of being an expert in its field. See id. at § 2:4, at 52.
31. Id. at § 2:1, at 44. Justice Learned Hand, in United States v. Carroll Tow-
ing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), wrote that in order to determine if reasonable
care was exercised, the following variables will need to be balanced: "(1) the
probability [of harm]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury . . .; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions." Carroll, 159 F.2d at 173 (citations omitted).
32. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 2:1, at 44.
33. 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 441-42.
36. See id. at 442.
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machine as designed made no provision for such a change. 37
The employee filed an action against the manufacturer, who im-
pleaded Robinson's employer as a third-party defendant.38 The
supreme court entered judgment in favor of Robinson, but the
court of appeals reversed. 39 In doing so, the court held that the
manufacturer could not be held strictly liable or negligent since
the employer substantially modified the machine after it had
left the hands of the manufacturer. 40 The court also held that
the employer's modification of the machine, which was not de-
fective when it left the manufacturer, was the proximate cause
of the employee's injuries.41
In its opinion, the court of appeals stated that "[a] cause of
action in negligence will lie where it can be shown that a manu-
facturer was responsible for a defect that caused injury, and
that the manufacturer could have foreseen the injury."42 How-
ever, as the facts revealed, the employer modified the machine
after it left the hands of the manufacturer. 43 In response to the
subsequent modification, the court held that
[tihe duty of a manufacturer, therefore, is not an open-ended one.
It extends to the design and manufacture of a finished product
which is safe at the time of sale. Material alterations at the
hands of a third party which work a substantial change in the
condition in which the product was sold by destroying the func-
tional utility of a key safety feature, however foreseeable that
modification may have been, are not within the ambit of a manu-
facturer's responsibility."
The court of appeals added that a manufacturer's duty to use
reasonable care when designing a product for its normal in-
tended use extends to unintended, yet foreseeable, uses as
well. 45 For example, the court provided that a manufacturer of
a screwdriver should foresee that a consumer may attempt to
use it to pry open a lid of a can and therefore the manufacturer
37. See id.
38. See Robinson, 403 N.E.2d at 441.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 443-44.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 444.
43. See Robinson, 403 N.E.2d at 443.
44. Id. at 444.
45. See id. (citing Micallefv. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1976)).
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should design the shank of the screwdriver with sufficient
strength to do so. 46
B. Breach of Warranty
A breach of warranty is governed by the law of contract
rather than tort law. 47 This area of products liability covers two
areas of warranty.48 The first is an express warranty49 and the
second is the area of implied warranties.50 An implied warranty
can be one of two types,5 1  an implied warranty of
merchantability52 or an implied warranty of fitness for a partic-
ular purpose. 53 An express warranty arises when the seller of a
product affirmatively asserts that "a product possesses certain
characteristics of quality, construction, performance capability,
durability, or safety."M An express warranty is breached when
the product fails to have a quality or characteristic repre-
sented.5 5 An implied warranty of merchantability runs with a
product and does not need to be expressed by the seller. 56 The
implied warranty of merchantability means that a product is fit
46. See id.
47. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 23, § 17.01, at 293, § 17.03, at 317. See
also OWEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 4:1, at 120-21.
48. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 23, § 17.01, at 293-94, § 17.03, at 317-23.
49. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1998). See also DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 23, § 17.03
[B], at 317 (1996) (providing a discussion on the application of U.C.C. § 2-313).
50. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -315 (1998). See also DIAMOND ET AL., supra note
23, § 17.03 [C], at 320-23 (1996) (providing a discussion on the application of
U.C.C. § 2-314 to -315).
51. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
52. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1998). See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.
161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). Henningsen involved a claim brought by a husband and
wife, after the wife was injured driving a new car purchased by her husband. See
id. at 73. While driving the car, "something... went wrong from the steering
wheel down to the front wheels," causing the wife to lose control of the car and
crash into a brick wall. Id. at 75. The jury returned a verdict for the husband and
wife, and an appeal followed. See id. at 73. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in
upholding the jury's verdict, held that Chrysler's attempt to disclaim an "implied
warranty of merchantability and the obligations arising therefrom was so inimical
to public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity." Id. at 95 (citations
omitted). The court defined an implied warranty of merchantability to mean that
"the thing sold is reasonably fit for the general purpose for which it is manufac-
tured and sold." Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 76.
53. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1998).
54. OWEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 4:2, at 122.
55. See id. at 122-23.
56. See id. § 4:5, at 141.
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for the ordinary purpose for which it is purchased or sold. 57 An
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises when
(1)the seller had reason to know that the buyer intended to use
the product for a particular purpose of which the seller was
aware; (2)... the seller had reason to know that the buyer was
relying upon the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish a
product suitable for that purpose; (3)... the buyer did thereby
rely on the seller; (4)... the product was not in fact fit for the
particular purpose; and (5). . . the unfitness for this purpose
caused the plaintiff harm. 58
The differences between the two types of warranties should be
noted. One difference is that, unlike an express warranty, an
implied warranty of merchantability does not require a direct
representation to the buyer; the warranty will attach at the
point of sale by operation of law.59 The difference between an
implied warranty of merchantability and an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose should also be noted.60 Both
types of warranties arise out of the sale of a product. 61 How-
ever, unlike a warranty of merchantability, which implies that
a "product will safely and effectively perform the normal func-
tions" for which it is ordinarily purchased or sold, a warranty of
fitness is "an implied promise by the seller that the product sold
will meet the buyer's particular needs."62
The requirement of privity in warranty claims is governed
by Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.").63
Section 2-318 provides three different alternatives for extending
warranties covering the sale of goods to persons other than the
purchaser of the goods.64 Such persons are known as "third-
57. See id. at 141, 148-49.
58. Id. § 4:8, at 155-56.
59. OWEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 4:5, at 141.
60. See id. at 154.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See Diane L. Schmauder, Annotation, Third-Party Beneficiaries of War-
ranties Under UCC § 2-318, 50 A.L.R.5th 327, 348 (1997).
64. See id. See also U.C.C. § 2-318 (1998). U.C.C. § 2-318 provides as follows:
§ 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied.
Note: If this Act is introduced in the Congress of the United States this
section should be omitted. (States to select one alternative.)
Alternative A
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party beneficiaries of the warranties."65 The three alternatives
are known as Alternatives A, B, and C.66 The alternatives vary
in respect to whom the warranties extend, with Alternative A
being the most restrictive and Alternative C being the least re-
strictive.67 Although the states are free to adopt any of the
three alternatives, some have enacted their own versions of § 2-
318.68 For instance, New York State adopted its own version of
Alternative B. 69 New York reworded Alternative B by "substi-
tuting 'if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use' for
'who may be reasonably expected to use."' 70 The State of Wash-
ington adopted Alternative A.71
The case of Denny v. Ford Motor Co.72 provides an excellent
example of an implied warranty claim. In Denny, Nancy Denny
("Denny") was severely injured when the Ford Bronco II she
was driving rolled over.73 In filing an action against Ford Motor
Company ("Ford"), Denny asserted claims for negligence, strict
liability based on a design defect, and breach of implied war-
ranty.7 4 A jury found strict liability for a design defect not to
A seller's warranty, whether express or implied, extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of the buyer or who is a guest in his
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the war-
ranty; a seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this provision.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty, whether express or implied, extends to any natural
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty; a seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this provision.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty, whether express or implied, extends to any person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured by breach of the warranty; a seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an
individual to whom the warranty extends. As amended 1966.
65. Schmauder, supra note 63, at 348.
66. See U.C.C. § 2-318.
67. See Schmauder, supra note 63, at 348.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 357 n.31, 363 n.36, 366 n.38, 392 n.56 & 397 n.59. See also N.Y.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1993).
70. Schmauder, supra note 63, at 392 n.56. See also N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318.
71. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-318 (West 1999).
72. 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).
73. See id. at 731.
74. See id.
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apply but that Ford breached its implied warranty.7 5 On ap-
peal, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished between de-
sign defect claims brought by way of a strict products liability
cause of action and a cause of action based upon a breach of an
implied warranty.7 6
The court noted that the difference between the two types
of actions lies in "the core element of 'defect."' 77 The court ex-
plained that a strict products liability claim for a design defect
involves the weighing "of the product's dangers against its over-
all advantages," while an implied warranty claim for a design
defect involves a determination of "whether the product in ques-
tion was 'fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used.'"78 The implied warranty claim focused on "the expecta-
tions for the performance of the product when used in the cus-
tomary, usual and reasonably foreseeable manners."79 Upon a
review of the evidence presented at the trial court level, the
court of appeals found that Ford provided adequate proof that
the value of the "off-road vehicle" design of the Bronco II out-
weighed the risks of rollover accidents that could occur when it
was used for other purposes.80 However, upon review of the evi-
dence presented by Denny, the court found that Denny relied on
representations made by Ford in selling Denny the Bronco 11.81
Ford's marketing manual represented that the Bronco II was
"'suitable to contemporary life styles' and... [was] 'considered
fashionable' in some suburban areas."8 2 Additionally, the sales
presentation manual directed a salesperson to "take into ac-
count the vehicle's 'suitability for commuting and for suburban
and city driving'... [and] 'appeal[ ] to women who may be con-
cerned about driving on snow and ice with their children."'8 3
Upon review of Denny's evidence, the court agreed that the ve-
hicle was not safe for the ordinary purposes for which it was
75. See id. at 733.
76. See id. at 734-39.
77. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 735.
78. Id. at 736 (citing U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 738.
81. See id. at 739.
82. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 732.
83. Id.
506 [Vol. 20:497
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/10
SIMPLY "TOO TENUOUS"
marketed and sold.8 4 Therefore, the court upheld a jury verdict
finding Ford liable for breaching its implied warranty, but not
strictly liable for a design defect.8 5
An action for the breach of an expressed warranty exists
when the goods do not conform to the description which created
the basis of a bargain.8 6 The case of Randy Knitwear, Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Co.87 involves a claim for the breach of an
express warranty.88 In Randy, the defendant, a resin manufac-
turer, widely advertised that fabrics treated with its resin pro-
cess would not shrink.8 9 Plaintiff, a manufacturer of children's
knitted sportswear and play clothes, purchased such fabrics
from two other parties.90 After manufacturing its garments and
selling them, the plaintiff began to receive complaints that the
garments shrank and did not retain their shape.91 The plaintiff
filed actions against the two parties from whom it had
purchased the materials and the defendant.92 The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions denying
summary judgment. 93 In doing so, the court held that, notwith-
standing lack of privity, when a manufacturer places its product
on the market by advertising and labeling it in such a way as to
induce the public's reliance upon its representations, the manu-
facturer will be held liable for an injury or loss due to any
misrepresentations. 94
84. See id. at 738.
85. See id. at 738-39.
86. See U.C.C. § 2-313. See also Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 35 P.2d 1090
(Wash. 1934). In Baxter, the plaintiff filed an action for personal injuries sustained
when the windshield of the automobile he purchased from the defendant was
struck by a pebble, causing a piece of glass to fly into the plaintiffs right eye. See
id. at 1091. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had made a representation
to him that the windshield was shatterproof. See id. In affirming the decision in
favor of the plaintiff, the Washington Supreme Court held that "[i]f a person states
as true material facts susceptible of knowledge to one who relies and acts thereon
to his injury, if the representations are false, it is immaterial that he did not know
they were false, or that he believed them to be true." Id. at 1092.
87. 181 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 1962).
88. See id. at 400.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Randy, 181 N.E.2d at 400.
93. See id. at 405.
94. See id. at 402.
20001 507
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In Randy, the New York Court of Appeals was concerned
with the fact that "the world of merchandising.., is no longer a
world of direct contract; it is, rather, a world of advertising
.... "95 The overall concern of the court was to provide consum-
ers with a way to protect themselves from injury and loss. 96
C. Strict Liability
In 1962, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,97 the
California Supreme Court stated that a "manufaturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being."98 The
Greenman decision was followed by Section 402(A) of the Re-
statement (Second), which provides that a person will be held
strictly liable if he sells "any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop-
erty . . . ."99 The purpose of Section 402(A) was to "eliminate
privity so that a user or consumer, without having to establish
negligence, could bring an action against a manufacturer, as
well as against any other member of the distribution chain that
had sold a product containing a manufacturing defect."100
Under Section 402(A), liability was considered strict because li-
ability attached without fault. 01 However, in order for a de-
fendant to have been found strictly liable under Section 402(A),
a plaintiff had to show that the product was defective at the
time it left the control of the defendant. 0 2 The plaintiff also
needed to show that there was a connection between its injuries
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). In Greenman, the plaintiff brought an action
against the manufacturer of a power tool for personal injuries he sustained. See
id. at 898. The plaintiff received a "Shopsmith" as a gift from his wife and was
severely injured while using it when a piece of wood flew out of the machine strik-
ing him in the forehead. See id. On appeal by the manufacturer, the California
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment finding the manufacturer strictly liable for
the plaintiffs injuries. See id. at 902.
98. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900.
99. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) supra note 25, § 402(A), at 347-48.
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, at 3.
101. See OwEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 5:1, at 252.
102. See id. § 5:3, at 70-73.
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and the alleged defect in the product. 03 Throughout the years,
several different tests were developed in order to determine
what amounted to a "defective condition" under Section
402(A).104 However, the effect of the Restatement (Third) on
Section 402(A) should be noted. 0 5
In 1973, the New York Court of Appeals extended the strict
products liability doctrine to protect "innocent non-user by-
standers" in the case of Codling v. Paglia.10 6 The Codling case
involved an action for personal injuries sustained by the Cod-
lings, when the automobile driven by Paglia traveled across a
double yellow line colliding head-on with the Codlings' car. 0 7
Paglia purchased the 1967 Chrysler about four months before
the accident. 08 He did not experience any problems with the
car's steering mechanism until the day of the accident. 09 Pag-
lia claimed that the car "suddenly and unexplainably" crossed
the double yellow line and collided with the Codlings' car. 10
The New York Court of Appeals held that
under a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a
defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged if the
defect was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury or
damages; provided: (1) that at the time of the occurrence the prod-
uct is being used (whether by the person injured or damaged or by
a third person) for the purpose and in the manner normally in-
tended, (2) that if the person injured or damaged is himself the
user of the product he would not by the exercise of reasonable care
have both discovered the defect and perceived its danger, and (3)
that by the exercise of reasonable care the person injured or dam-
aged would not otherwise have averted his injury or damages."'
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in
favor of the Codlings against Chrysler but reversed and re-
manded the judgment in favor of Paglia against Chrysler for his
103. See id.
104. See generally id. §§ 5:5 to :8, at 291-323 (providing a review of the tests
applicable to a finding of strict liability).
105. See infra notes 137-56 and accompanying text.
106. 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).
107. See id. at 624.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Codling, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29.
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personal injuries and property damage. 112 In affirming the deci-
sion in favor of the Codlings, the court of appeals agreed with
the jury's conclusion that
Chrysler had produced an automobile with a defective steering
mechanism; that the defect was a substantial factor in bringing
about the accident and thus the injuries to the Codlings; that at
the time of the accident Paglia was using the automobile for the
purpose and in the manner normally intended; that by the exer-
cise of reasonable care, Paglia would neither have discovered the
defective steering mechanism nor perceived its danger; and that,
as to the Codlings, the exercise of reasonable care on their part
would otherwise not have averted the accident. 1
13
The purpose of imposing strict liability upon a manufac-
turer arises from the manufacturer's ability to foresee injuries
and to protect against them. 114 It also relates to the manufac-
turer's ability "to insure against the risk of injury and .. .to
spread the costs of risk avoidance amongst its customers."
1 5
Furthermore, it would place too difficult a burden upon the con-
sumer to identify and prove "negligent conduct on behalf of a
manufacturer or others in the chain of distribution."116 In Cod-
ling, the New York Court of Appeals expressed concern about
how technology advanced to a point of being out of reach of both
the consumer and bystander or nonuser. 1 7 The court felt that
"from the standpoint of justice as regards the operating aspect
of today's products, responsibility should be laid on the manu-
facturer, subject to ... limitations . l"118 It continued that a
manufacturer should not be immune from liability arising from
112. See id. at 629. Paglia cross claimed against Chrysler for an amount over
the judgment awarded in favor of the Codlings against him. See id. at 630. Paglia
also cross-claimed against Chrysler for his own personal injuries and property
damages. See id. The initial cross-claim was dismissed and affirmed and the sec-
ond was remanded for a new trial. See id. Paglia's second cross-claim involved the
issue of contributory negligence, which is not relevant to this article. See Codling,
298 N.E.2d at 629-30.
113. Id. at 629.
114. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 23, §17.04, at 330 (discussing the court's
rationale in construing Restatement § 402(A) and § 402(A)'s close relation to Jus-
tice Traynor's reasoning in the case of Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d
436 (Cal. 1944)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Codling, 298 N.E.2d at 627.
118. Id.
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injuries sustained by people whom the manufacturer could rea-
sonably foresee would be injured due to its defective product. 119
It added that both justice and common sense require the exten-
sion of recovery to bystanders since they have less of a chance to
discover any defects in a product.120
D. Misrepresentation
Liability for tortious misrepresentation may occur under
one of three common law theories. 121 The three theories are: (1)
fraud; (2) negligent misrepresentation, and (3) strict liability for
making false public misrepresentations about one's product. 122
Section 402(B) of the Restatement (Second) governs modern day
strict liability for misrepresentation. 123 The case of Young v.
Robertshaw Controls Co. 124 provides an example of where the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, found that a
plaintiff adequately stated a claim of fraud.125
In Young, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, held that "[the essential elements of a cause of action for
fraud are the intentional misrepresentation of a material fact,
reliance thereon and an injury resulting from the misrepresen-
tation."126 Mrs. Young filed a claim against Robertshaw Con-
trols Company ("Robertshaw") for the death of her husband, due
to a propane gas water heater explosion. 127 Mrs. Young alleged
that a defective valve in the heater caused the explosion. 128
Robertshaw was the manufacturer of the defective valve. 29 In
bringing her action, Mrs. Young asserted that Robertshaw had
knowledge of the products' defectiveness and "failed to recall
119. See id. (citing Codling v. Paglia, 38 A.D.2d 154, 158 (3d Dep't 1972)).
120. See id. (citing Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., Inc., 40 A.D.2d 289, 293 (4th
Dep't 1973)).
121. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 3:1, at 78.
122. See id.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 25, § 402(B), at 358. Section 9 of
the Restatement (Third) incorporates the principles of § 402(B). See RESTATEMENT
(THi-D), supra note 26, § 9 & cmt. b. See also OWEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 3:5, at
102 n.8, § 5:12, at 354-55.
124. 481 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1984).
125. See id. at 894.
126. Id. at 893 (citing Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc.,
151 N.E.2d 833 (N.Y. 1958)).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Young, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
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the valves or to adequately warn dealers and the public of the
danger."130 Mrs. Young also asserted that Robertshaw failed to
disclose the danger to consumers and misled the Consumer
Products Safety Commission as to the extent of the risk.13'
In support of the claim, evidence was presented in order to
show Robertshaw's knowledge and concealment of the defect
and accompanying danger. 3 2 In response to the evidence, the
court reasoned that the concealment, "was undertaken with the
intention of deceiving the public at large as to the continued
fitness for use of this control valve which defendant had placed
in commerce and minimizing recoveries in lawsuits generated
by the faulty control."133 In continuing, the court noted that
contrary to the notion that nondisclosure or concealment alone
does not amount to actionable fraud 34
it is a principle of long standing that "one who sells an article
knowing it to be dangerous by reason of concealed defects is guilty
of a wrong, without regard to the contract, and is liable in dam-
ages to any person, including one not in privity of contract with
him, who suffers an injury by reason of his willful and fraudulent
deceit and concealment."135
In finding that Robertshaw intentionally concealed the danger
of the defect and failed to warn of the danger, the court held
that Mrs. Young adequately stated a cause of action in fraud. 136
E. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
On May 20, 1997, the American Law Institute adopted and
promulgated the Restatement (Third).137 One of the most im-
portant changes found in the Restatement (Third) is the effect
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 893-94. The evidence revealed that the defect resulted in
.more than 100 accidents, resulting in 32 deaths and 77 injuries." Id.
133. Young, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
134. See id. (citing Simcuski v. Saeli, 377 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1978); Moser v.
Spizzirro, 295 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't 1968), affd, 252 N.E.2d 632 (N.Y. 1969)).
135. Id. (quoting Kuelling v. Lean Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. 1098, 1102 (N.Y. 1905)).
136. See id. (citing Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D.
Md. 1981)). The court stated that since this specific proceeding was at the plead-
ing stage, it would not resolve the issue of whether, as alleged, "a causal connec-
tion exist[ed] between the avowed misrepresentations and the injuries suffered."
Id.
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26.
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that Section 2 has on 402(A) of the Restatement (Second). Sec-
tion 2 of the Restatement (Third) "rejects the singular definition
of defect found in Section 402(A)." 138 In doing so, Section 2 "sets
forth three exclusive categories of defect: A product liability
claim may be based on (1) an alleged manufacturing defect; (2)
an alleged defect in design; or (3) an alleged defect based on
inadequate warnings." 139 Comment n to Section 2 provides that
"the rules [in Section 21 are stated functionally rather than in
terms of traditional doctrinal categories." 40 Comment n also
provides that if the prerequisites of Subsections (a), (b), and (c)
of Section 2, or the other provisions of Chapter 1 are met, "the
doctrinal tort categories such as negligence or strict liability
may be utilized."141 By repealing Section 402(A) of the Restate-
ment (Second), the Restatement (Third) "imposes 'true' strict lia-
bility for manufacturing defects," while using "fault-based
concepts of liability for failure to warn and design.' 142
In Comment a to Section 2, the drafters of the Restatement
discuss several reasons often cited for upholding strict liability
for manufacturing defects, as defined under Subsection (a) of
138. Victor E. Schwartz, et al., The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Li-
ability: A Guide to Its Highlights, BRIEFLY. . . PERSP. ON LEGIS., REG., & LITIG.,
Feb. 1998, at 1, 5. Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) provides:
§ 2. Categories of Product Defect
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inade-
quate instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its in-
tended design even though all possible care was exercised in the prepa-
ration and marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reason-
able alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predeces-
sor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the
seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders
the product not reasonably safe.
139. Schwartz, supra note 138, at 5.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 2 cmt. n, at 34-35.
141. Id.
142. Schwartz, supra note 138, at 5-6.
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Section 2.143 First, strict liability will encourage greater invest-
ment in the development and production of products.14 Second,
in many cases "manufacturing defects are in fact caused by
manufacturer negligence" which plaintiffs will have difficulty
proving.145 An application of strict liability will avoid plaintiffs'
facing sometimes "difficult or insuperable problems of proof."146
The drafters also provide that since manufacturers choose the
level of quality control in manufacturing a product, they have
"knowledge that a predictable number of flawed products will
enter into the marketplace" deliberately causing a known
amount of injury.147 Finally, the drafters add that it is "often-
cited" that "product sellers as business entities are in a better
position than are individual users and consumers to better in-
sure against ... losses."148
Liability under Subsections (b) and (c) of Section 2 is based
upon a level of reasonable foreseeability. 149 For instance, Sub-
section (b) of Section 2 provides that a manufacturer will be
held subject to liability when "the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design ... and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe."150 The requirement of a plaintiff having to prove a rea-
sonable alternative design caused great debate during the
drafting of the Restatement (Third).15 1 Under Subsection (c), li-
ability attaches when there exists "foreseeable risks of harm" by
143. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 2 cmt. a, at 14-17.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 15.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 2 cmt. a, at 15.
149. See id. § 2 cmt. a, at 17.
150. Id. § 2(b), at 14.
151. See Schwartz, supra note 138, at 6. Mr. Schwartz notes that the drafters
were able to accommodate the concerns of the plaintiffs' lawyers. See id. When a
plaintiffs lawyer is required to prove a reasonable alternative design ("RAD"), Sec-
tion 3 of the Restatement (Third) allows the lawyer to use circumstantial evidence
in support of finding a RAD. See id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26,
§ 3, at 111. Additionally, Comment e to Section 2, operates as an "escape hatch"
for the RAD requirement. See Schwartz, supra note 138, at 7. See also RESTATE-
MENT (TMHRD), supra note 26, § 2 cmt. e, at 21-22. Comment e may allow liability to
attach in the absence of proof of a RAD. See Schwartz, supra note 138, at 7. See
also RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 26, § 2 cmt. e, at 21-22.
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failing to provide "reasonable instructions or warnings," and
such "omission of the instruction or warnings renders the prod-
uct not reasonably safe."152 Subsections (b) and (c) are meant to
"achieve the same general objectives as does liability predicated
on negligence." 153 The drafters provide that the "emphasis is on
creating incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels
of safety in designing and marketing products."154 Additionally,
the drafters noted that a "reasonably designed product still car-
ries with it elements of risk that must be protected against by
the user or consumer since some risks cannot be designed out of
the product at reasonable cost." 155 Therefore, Subsections (b)
and (c) incorporate a "risk-utility" test, balancing "costs and
benefits," when defining defects in design, instructions, and
warnings."'5 6
III. The Rescue Doctrine
"Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to
relief."157
Justice Cardozo, 1921
The rescue doctrine was designed to protect individuals
faced with an emergency. 158 The doctrine acknowledges that
those faced with an emergency will act upon instinct, with no
time to reflect over following consequences. 159 The doctrine
shields a rescuer from liability arising out of the rescue.160
However, in order for the actions of a rescuer to fall within the
protections of the doctrine, the rescuer's conduct must be the
same as that of a reasonable person under the same circum-
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 2(c), at 14.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 16-17. Comment a provides that most courts agree that: "for the
liability system to be fair and efficient, the balancing of risks and benefits in judg-
ing product design and marketing must be done in light of the knowledge of risks
and risk-avoidance reasonable attainable at the time of distribution." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 2(c), at 16-17.
157. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
158. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 33, at 196 & n.26 (5th ed. 1984).
159. See id.
160. See id.
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stances. 161 The rescue doctrine also provides a source of recov-
ery to a rescuer who is injured while rescuing another. 162 In the
case of Provenzo v. Sam, 63 the New York Court of Appeals set
forth two different situations where the rescue doctrine has
been applied.'6 The first situation involves three people, where
one party's act puts a second in peril and a third comes to the
rescue.165 The second situation involves two people, where a
party has put himself into peril and another comes to his
rescue.166
Although the courts have applied the rescue doctrine to
many different types of actions, 67 they have declined to apply it
in the area of medical malpractice. 68 The rescue doctrine has
been widely established and accepted due to its strong policy
considerations; however, different jurisdictions take different
approaches in applying it. 169 For example, the State of Wash-
ington developed a four-prong test for the application of the res-
cue doctrine. 170
161. See id.
162. See Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437-38. See also Maltman v. Sauer, 530 P.2 254,
256 (Wash. 1975).
163. 244 N.E.2d 26 (N.Y. 1968). The case involved an action brought by a
driver who sustained serious injuries attempting to rescue the driver and passen-
ger of a car involved in an accident. See id. at 27. The plaintiff observed the auto-
mobile swerving back and forth on the highway before hitting a car, crossing over
the highway, colliding with a house and coming to rest on the front lawn of the
house. See id. The plaintiff, after parking his car on the opposite side of the high-
way, attempted to cross the highway to render assistance and was struck by an
automobile owned and operated by the defendant. See id. The court remanded the
case for the jury to consider whether the plaintiff acted reasonably in light of the
emergency confronting him. See Provenzo, 244 N.E.2d at 29.
164. See id. at 28.
165. See id.
166. See id. (citing Carney v. Buyea, 271 A.D. 338 (4th Dep't 1946); Talbert v.
Talbert, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady Co. (1960)).
167. See, e.g., Rowlands v. Parks, 138 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 1956) (involving a de-
fendant's application of the rescue doctrine); Oberman v. Alexander's Rent-A-Car,
392 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1st Dep't 1977) (involving application of rescue doctrine to six-
car chain accident).
168. See David E. Seidelson, The Rescue Doctrine in Medical Malpractice and
Product Liability Actions: So Much for Heroes, 17 Miss. C.L. REv. 325 (1997).
169. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Rescue Doctrine: Liability of One Who
Negligently Causes Motor Vehicle Accident for Injuries to Person Subsequently At-
tempting to Rescue Persons or Property, 73 A.L.R.4th 737 (1990).
170. See infra text accompanying note 267.
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The rescue doctrine was developed in 1921 by the New
York Court of Appeals in Wagner v. International Railway
Co.171 In Wagner, the plaintiffs cousin was thrown from a
crowded railway car after the car violently lurched while round-
ing a corner. 17 2 The plaintiff, in an attempt to rescue his cousin,
walked more than 445 feet out along the trestle and, while sur-
rounded in darkness, missed his footing and fell.173 The plain-
tiff claimed that the conductor had asked him to walk out along
the trestle to the point where he thought his cousin fell out of
the car.174 The plaintiff also stated that the conductor followed
behind him with a lantern. 175 The conductor denied both of the
statements. 76 At a trial to recover for personal injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiff, the trial judge held that he would not
find the defendant liable "unless two facts were found: First,
that the plaintiff had been invited by the conductor to go upon
the bridge, and second, that the conductor had followed with a
light."177 With these limitations, the jury found in favor of the
defendant. 78
On appeal, the defendant argued that the court "must stop
following the chain of causes, when the action ceases to be 'in-
stinctive.'" 79 The court interpreted this to mean "that [the] res-
cue is at the peril of the rescuer, unless spontaneous and
immediate." 80 In its first argument, the defendant stated that
while walking more than 445 feet out on the trestle, the plain-
tiff had time to deliberate and to "reflect and weigh," at which
point "impulse had been followed by choice." 18' The court con-
tinued that "[i]f there has been time to deliberate, if impulse
has given way to judgment, one cause, it is said, has spent its
force, and another has intervened." 8 2 The defendant asked the
court to find that the sequence of events between the peril and
171. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 438.
180. Id.
181. Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438.
182. Id.
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the rescue must be of "unbroken continuity" in order for the
plaintiff to recover. 183 Justice Cardozo responded that
continuity in such circumstances is not broken by the exercise of
volition. So sweeping an exception, if recognized, would leave lit-
tle of the rule. 'The human mind,' as we have said, People v.
Majone, 91 N.Y. 211, 212 (1883), 'acts with celerity which it is
sometimes impossible to measure.' The law does not discriminate
between the rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who counts the
cost. It is enough that the act, whether impulsive or deliberate, is
the child of the occasion. 184
The court was unwilling to find that an unbroken chain be-
tween a rescuer's impulse in reaction to a specific event and the
actions taken to avoid its consequences was required. 185
The defendant also argued that the plaintiff should have
gone below the trestle, as did the other searchers, in search of
the plaintiffs cousin. 86 The defendant stated that the plain-
tiffs "conduct was not responsive to the call of the emergency; it
was a wanton exposure to a danger that was useless."187 In re-
sponse to this argument, Justice Cardozo held that a plaintiffs
"'[e]rrors of judgment'... would not count against him if they
resulted 'from the excitement and confusion of the moment' "188
while voluntarily rescuing another. 189
The Provenzo Court followed the decision in Wagner and
added that even if a plaintiff establishes the necessary elements
for invoking the doctrine, he must still show that he "acted as a
reasonable man under the circumstances," in order to avoid be-
ing found contributorily negligent. 90 The court also noted that
"the wisdom of hindsight is not determinative on the issue of
the doctrine's applicability."' 91 It continued that "[slo long as
the rescue attempted can be said to have been a reasonable
183. Id.
184. Id. at 438 (citing Twomley v. Central Park N. & E. River R.R. Co., 69
N.Y. 158 (1877); Donnely v. Piercy Contracting Co., 118 N.E. 605 (N.Y. 1918)); Bird
v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 120 N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918)).
185. See id.
186. See Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438.
187. Id. (citing Miller v. Union Ry. Co. of N.Y. City, 83 N.E. 583, 584 (N.Y.
1908)).
188. Id. (citing Corbin v. Philadelphia, 45 Atl. 1070 (Pa. 1900)).
189. Id.
190. Provenzo, 244 N.E.2d at 28.
191. Id.
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course of conduct at the time, it is of no import that the danger
was not as real as it appeared."192
IV. Proximate Cause
"[Tihe orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigi-
lance would be the orbit of duty."193
Justice Cardozo, 1928
In order for a plaintiff to bring a products liability claim
against a defendant, the defendant's conduct must be the legal
cause of a plaintiffs injuries.' 94 Legal cause consists of two ele-
ments, cause-in-fact and proximate cause. 95 Both elements are
needed to show legal cause. 96 Cause-in-fact inquires whether
the defendant's conduct was a substantial contributing factor in
bringing about the harm. 97 Therefore, it follows that the "de-
fendant's conduct or product is known as the sine qua non of the
plaintiffs injury."198  Proximate cause generally inquires
"whether plaintiffs loss is too remote or too removed from [the]
defendant's conduct, or whether the conduct of the plaintiff or
others operates as an unforeseeable intervening cause to break
the chain of causation and extinguish the defendant's legal re-
sponsibility."199 There exists no single definition by which prox-
imate cause is known. 200
There are three ways to approach the proximate cause in-
quiry.20' The first approach finds proximate cause when the
risk of harm brought about by the product defect could have
been foreseen by the defendant at the time of manufacture. 20 2
192. Id. (citing Carney v. Buyea, 271 A.D. 338 (4th Dep't 1946)).
193. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing
how far liability for a harm to another should extend).
194. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 12:1, at 726.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 727 & n.3.
198. Id. at 727.
199. OWEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 12:1, at 727.
200. See id. § 13:1, at 779. The authors note that "[n]o single generally ac-
cepted definition of 'proximate cause' has yet been found and agreed upon" by
courts or legal writers. Id. See also TIMOTHY E. TRAVER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4:1, at 12 (3d ed. 1993).
201. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 29, § 13:1, at 779. In addition, § 13:3 pro-
vides a discussion on intervening and superseding causes. See id. at 788-97.
202. See id. at 779-80.
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The second approach finds proximate cause when a defendant's
acts, "which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and with-
out which the injury would not have occurred."2 3 The final ap-
proach set forth in the Restatement (Second), provides that once
the tortious conduct is "determined to be a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm, [it] is [the] legal cause of [the] harm if
there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because
of the manner in which his act ... resulted in the harm."204 The
discussion within this section of the article will focus on proxi-
mate cause, since it is the main issue in the McCoy case, dis-
cussed infra.205
In 1980, the New York Court of Appeals, in the case of Der-
diarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.,20 6 reasoned that "[t]he con-
cept of proximate cause, or more appropriately legal cause, has
proven to be an elusive one, incapable of being precisely defined
to cover all situations."2 7 This was so because it "stems from
policy considerations that serve to place manageable limits
upon the liability that flows from negligent conduct."208 The
court asserted that due to the "unique" inquiry in each case, the
finder of fact would determine the existence of legal cause. 20 9
The case would only go to the finder of fact if the court found
that a prima facie case had been established. 210
In Derdiarian, Derdiarian had been working at a roadway
site, when defendant James Dickens suffered an epileptic
seizure and lost consciousness, causing his automobile to go out
of control, speed into the work site and strike Derdiarian. 211
Derdiarian was thrown into the air and, when he landed, was
splattered with 400 degree liquid enamel from a kettle struck
by Dickens' automobile. 212 It was later discovered that Dickens
203. Id. at 780 & n.8.
204. Id. at 780 & n.9.
205. See McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 P.2d 31 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997), affd, 961 P.2d 952 (Wash. 1998).
206. 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980).
207. Id. at 670.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d at 669.
212. See id.
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failed to take his medication as required. 213 Derdiarian and his
wife filed an action against his employer Felix Contracting
Corp. ("Felix"), a subcontractor for Consolidated Edison Com-
pany of New York, Inc., and Dickens for the personal injuries he
had sustained. 214 At trial, Derdiarian claimed that Felix inade-
quately insured the safety of the workers at the roadway site.215
Derdiarian presented an expert witness on traffic safety,216 who
testified that the construction site should have been completely
enclosed by a heavy barrier.217 The witness testified that such a
barrier, consisting of a truck, a piece of heavy equipment or a
pile of dirt, would keep a car out of the excavation site and pro-
tect workers from oncoming traffic. 218 The witness also added
that two flagmen, rather than one, should have been at the site
and that warning signs should have been set up.219 The evi-
dence presented revealed that the site was protected solely by a
single wooden horse barricade, set up on the west side of the
site. 220 A verdict was rendered in favor of Derdiarian and his
wife.221
On appeal, Felix argued that "there was no causal link, as a
matter of law, between Felix's breach of duty and plaintiffs in-
juries." 2 2 2 The court stated that "[wihere the acts of a third per-
son intervene between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiffs injury," and are of "a normal or foreseeable conse-
quence of the... defendant's negligence," the causal connection
will not be broken.223 However, when "the intervening act is ex-
traordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the nor-
mal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the
defendant's conduct, it may well be a superseding act which
breaks the causal nexus."224 The court continued that questions
concerning "what is foreseeable and what is normal" are to be
213. See id. at 669.
214. See id. at 668-69.
215. See id. at 669.
216. See Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d at 669.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d at 670.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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left to the jury.225 However, the court noted that there are some
situations "where only one conclusion may be drawn from the
established facts and where the question of legal cause may be
decided as a matter of law."226 These situations involve "inter-
vening acts which operate upon but do not flow from the origi-
nal negligence." 227 The court used Ventricelli v. Kinney System
Rent A Car228 as an example in which legal cause was decided
as a matter of law. 229 The Ventricelli court held that an automo-
bile lessor who negligently supplied a car with a defective trunk
lid to a lessee was not liable to the lessee when he was injured
by the negligent driving of another while stopped to repair the
trunk.230 The court held that "[allthough the renter's negli-
gence undoubtedly served to place the injured party at the site
of the accident, the intervening act was divorced from and not
the foreseeable risk associated with the original negligence." 231
The court added that the injuries were not of the type likely to
result from a defective trunk lid.232 The court summed up the
case of Ventricelli as a negligence case which "merely furnished
the occasion for an unrelated act to cause injuries not ordinarily
anticipated."233
In contrasting Derdiarian to Ventricelli, the Derdiarian
Court held that it could not say as a matter of law that the neg-
ligence of Dickens was a superseding cause interrupting Felix's
negligence and Derdiarian's injuries. 234 It added that "[an in-
tervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve
an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act
occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor
negligent."235
225. Id.
226. Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d at 670.
227. Id.
228. 383 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 1978).
229. See Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d at 671.
230. See Ventricelli, 383 N.E.2d at 1149.
231. Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d at 671.
232. See id. at 671.
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. Id.
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V. The Opinions of the Washington Court of Appeals and
Washington Supreme Court in McCoy v.
American Suzuki Motor Corp.236
"Regardless of whether a plaintiff is a voluntary or professional
rescuer, he must show that the defendant's negligence was the
proximate and legal cause of his injury."237
Associate Justice Hunter, 1975
At about 5:00 PM on a cold November evening, a driver of a
Suzuki Samurai lost control of the vehicle when it hit a patch of
black ice and began to swerve. 238 In an attempt to gain control
over the vehicle, the passenger in the Samurai grabbed the
steering wheel, causing it to go further out of control.239 The
Samurai swerved off the road and rolled.240 James McCoy ("Mc-
Coy"), having witnessed the accident, stopped to help the occu-
pants of the Samurai and found that the driver had been
severely injured.241 Upon the arrival of a Washington State Pa-
trol Trooper, McCoy was asked to be of further assistance by
placing flares along the highway to warn approaching traffic.242
Out of concern that the flares would be inadequate, McCoy posi-
tioned himself a quarter of a mile down the road, with a flare in
each hand, and manually directed traffic. 243
Almost two hours later, at about 6:50 PM, "the injured
driver and passenger of the Suzuki were removed and the scene
was cleared."24 Only the trooper and McCoy remained. 245 After
the trooper drove away without a word to McCoy, McCoy began
walking along the shoulder of the highway with a lit flare in his
roadside hand to get to his car, and was struck by a hit-and-run
driver.246
236. 936 P.2d 31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), affd 961 P.2d 952 (Wash. 1998).
237. Maltman v. Sauer, 530 P.2d 254, 259 (Wash. 1975).
238. See McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 961 P.2d 952, 955 (Wash.
1998).
239. See McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 P.2d 31, 32 n.1 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1997).
240. See McCoy, 961 P.2d at 955.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. See McCoy, 961 P.2d at 955.
246. See id.
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The McCoys filed a multi-count suit against
the driver of the Suzuki for negligent driving; the passenger of the
Suzuki for negligently grabbing the steering wheel when the car
was fishtailing, further causing it to lose control; the State for the
negligence of the trooper; and American Suzuki Motor Corpora-
tion, and its parent corporation, Suzuki Motor Company, Ltd.,
["Suzuki"] for its allegedly defective Samurai which allegedly
caused the wreck in the first place.24 7
The McCoys filed their claim under the Washington Prod-
uct Liability act ("PLA"). 248 McCoy claimed that "the Suzuki
Samurai was defectively designed and manufactured, was not
reasonably safe by virtue of its tendency to roll, and lacked
proper warnings."249 McCoy claimed that it was the defect in
the Samurai that caused the accident, and that he was injured
while acting within the realm of the rescue doctrine.250 There-
fore, McCoy alleged that Suzuki should be held liable for his
injuries.251
In moving for summary judgment, Suzuki asserted that "(1)
the rescue doctrine does not apply to products liability actions;
and (2) even if it does, McCoy must still, but cannot, prove
Suzuki proximately caused his injuries."252 Although the trial
court held that the rescue doctrine does apply to products liabil-
ity actions, the trial judge held that "being struck by a hit-and-
run driver was too remote a circumstance and therefore not a
foreseeable consequence of a defective product."253 Therefore,
the trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of Suzuki,
holding that the alleged design defect was not the proximate
cause of McCoy's injuries.2M The McCoys appealed.255 The ap-
pellate court stated that the trial court's analysis would be
sound if the issue was whether the McCoys' injuries were fore-
seeable consequences of the manufacturing of a defective car;
however, it pointed out that the cause of action was brought
247. Id.
248. See id. See also WASH. REV. CODE tit. 7, Chap. 7.72 (1999).
249. McCoy, 961 P.2d at 955.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. McCoy, 936 P.2d 31, 32.
254. See McCoy, 961 P.2d at 955.
255. See id.
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under the rescue doctrine. 256 In doing so, the appellate court
held the "[rescue] doctrine varies the ordinary rule of negli-
gence: [by] permit[ting] the rescuer to sue on the basis of [a]
defendant's initial negligence toward the party rescued, without
the necessity of proving negligence toward the rescuer .... ,,257
The appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of
Suzuki and remanded the matter for trial. 258 On appeal, the
Washington Supreme Court affirmed and remanded on differ-
ent grounds. 259
In its argument to the Washington Court of Appeals,
Suzuki argued that "the PLA abrogated a rescue doctrine cause
of action because the doctrine is an outgrowth of common law
negligence,"260 and that "liability for a design defect under the
PLA should not extend to bystanders."261 In its first argument,
Suzuki asserted that "liability under the PLA extends to those
injuries caused directly 'by the product to the person or the
property of the claimant.'" 262 Suzuki also argued "that the Leg-
islature did not intend to engraft ordinary negligence principles
onto the law of design defect product liability claims."263 The
court of appeals held that neither of the arguments was plausi-
ble.26 As for Suzuki's argument that liability for a design de-
256. See McCoy, 936 P.2d at 32.
257. Id. (quoting Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 491 P.2d 821, 825 (Ca.
1971)).
258. See id.
259. See McCoy, 961 P.2d at 954.
260. McCoy, 936 P.2d at 32.
261. Id. at 33.
262. Id. at 32 (quoting Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fi-
sons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993)).
263. Id. at 33 (citing Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 818 P.2d
1337, 1344-45 (Wash. 1991)).
264. See id. The court of appeals stated that Washington State Physicians
Insurance Exchange & Ass'n, 858 P.2d at 1065, did not involve the rescue doctrine.
See McCoy, 936 P.2d at 33. It held that the case involved a treating physician
bringing a cause of action against a drug company for personal and professional
injuries suffered when a patient he was treating suffered an adverse reaction to a
drug that he prescribed. See id. There, the Washington Supreme Court held that
the facts did not support a cause of action under the PLA and that the court needed
to be "cautious about extending a right to recover for emotional harm, 'especially
when the distress is the consequence of an injury suffered by a third person.'" Id.
(quoting Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n, 858 P.2d at 1065). In
finding that Ayers did not apply, the Washington State Court of Appeals held that
the case involved a "products liability suit ... based on a manufacturer's failure to
warn of the danger of aspirating baby oil." Id. The Washington State Court of
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fect under the PLA should not extend to a bystander, the court
distinguished between a bystander and a rescuer.265 In doing
so, the court concluded that McCoy was a rescuer. 266
In finding that the PLA does not erode a rescuer's right to
recover and agreeing with McCoy's contention that a rescuer
could recover for injuries sustained during a rescue if the res-
cuer qualified under the four elements of the rescue doctrine set
forth in French v. Chase,267 the court applied the facts to the
elements. 268 In applying the facts to the first element, that the
"negligence proximately caus[ed] the peril," the court held that
the trier of fact "must determine if (1) the Samurai had a design
defect and, if so, (2) whether the alleged defect proximately re-
sulted in the peril here, as opposed to the ice, excessive speed,
the passenger's grabbing of the steering wheel, or any other fac-
tor."269 In response to the second element, that there be an im-
minence of peril or reasonable appearance of imminence,
Suzuki argued that the McCoys should not be entitled to re-
Appeals stated that Ayers "stands for the proposition that despite the language of
RCW 7.72 030(1) (manufacturer subject to liability for design defect based on neg-
ligence), foreseeability is not an element of a failure-to-warn claim." Id. (citing
Ayers, 818 P.2d 1345).
265. See McCoy, 936 P.2d at 33.
266. See id.
267. 297 P.2d 235 (Wash. 1956). In French, the Washington Supreme Court
defined the four elements as follows:
(1) There must be negligence on the part of the defendant which is the
proximate cause of the peril, or what would appear to a reasonable person,
under the circumstances, to be peril, to the life or limb of another.
(2) The peril, or reasonable appearance of peril, to the life and limb of
another must be imminent.
(3) In determining whether the peril, or the appearance of peril, is im-
minent, in the sense that an emergency exists requiring immediate action,
the circumstances presented to the rescuer must be such that a reasonably
prudent man, under the same or similar circumstances, would determine
that such peril existed. (The issue of whether the rescuer's determination
conformed with the reasonably prudent man standard is a question for the
jury, under proper instructions.)
(4) After determining that imminent peril to the life or limb of a person
exists, the rescuer, in effecting the rescue, must be guided by the standard of
reasonable care under the circumstances. (Whether there has been conform-
ance with this standard also is a question for the jury, under the proper
instructions.)
Id. at 239.
268. See McCoy, 936 P.2d at 32.
269. Id. at 34.
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cover under the rescue doctrine because the peril to life and
limb of the occupants of the Samurai was not imminent.270 The
court held that it was for the trier of fact to make such a deter-
mination.271 As for the third element, the court held that the
trier of fact would have to determine if McCoy's perception of
imminent peril was reasonable. 272 The court also held that the
"reasonableness of [McCoy's] conduct in effecting [the] rescue"
had to be determined by the trier of fact.273 Suzuki argued that
at the time McCoy was injured, he was returning to his car.274
In considering the facts of the case, the court "conclud[ed that]
the jury might conclude [that] Mr. McCoy's activities were
within the scope of his rescue."275 In doing so, the court ordered
reversal of the summary judgment and remanded the matter
for trial.2 7 6
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thompson agreed with the
majority's version of the facts, but respectfully disagreed as to
its holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment in favor of Suzuki.277 He felt that the trial court did not
err because "Suzuki Motor Company, Ltd. was not the proxi-
mate cause of James McCoy's injuries and the imminent danger
element of the rescue doctrine was not met."278
In addressing the rescue doctrine, Justice Thompson stated
that "the first inquiry should be whether Suzuki's negligence
270. See id. at 34. In making its argument, Suzuki relied on Hawkins v.
Palmer, 188 P.2d 121 (Wash. 1947). There, the Washington Supreme Court found
that the plaintiff, who stopped to assist at the scene of a motorcycle accident, was
not engaged in a rescue. See id. at 121. The Washington Supreme Court held that
the doctrine applies "when one acts impulsively, oblivious to peril, to save or assist
an injured person whose injury is imminent; or when, conscious of the peril and
weighing the consequences, he nonetheless goes to the aid of the injured person or
person whose injury is imminent." Id. at 124. The Washington Supreme Court
held "that the plaintiff did not knowingly encounter danger to assist the victims:
[tihe injured man seemingly was in no more imminent or serious peril at that mo-
ment than he had been for a considerable period of time prior thereto." Id. "There
was no known danger or peril threatening the victims." Id. The McCoy court held
that Hawkins was distinguishable. See McCoy, 936 P.2d at 34.
271. See McCoy, 936 P.2d at 34.
272. See id.
273. Id. at 35.
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. See McCoy, 936 P.2d at 35.
277. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
278. McCoy, 936 P.2d at 35. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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was the proximate cause of Mr. McCoy's injuries."279 He stated
that "[piroximate cause requires a showing of cause in fact and
legal causation."280 He defined cause in fact as "cause but for
which the accident would not have happened"281 and added that
"cause in fact is generally a question of fact."282
Justice Thompson noted that "[1]egal causation involves
'policy considerations of how far a defendant's acts should ex-
tend, and is a question of law.'" 283 In defining legal cause, he
stated that consideration should be given to "causation, inter-
vening events, duty, foreseeability, reliance, remoteness and
privity."284 He also stated that "the application of the rescue
doctrine is limited to situations where the plaintiff can establish
that his injury was attributable to a cause which was reason-
ably foreseeable given the danger created by the defendant's
original act of negligence."28 5
In applying his analysis, Justice Thompson noted that
Suzuki's design defect was not the legal cause of McCoy's inju-
ries.28 6 He continued that the injuries caused by the design de-
fect are limited to the occupants of the Suzuki, and to go beyond
them, one would have to rely on the rescue doctrine, which is
not applicable under these circumstances. 28 7 He said "[t]he al-
leged negligence is too remote and insubstantial to impose lia-
bility."288 Not only did Justice Thompson find proximate cause
to be non-existent, but he also mentioned that McCoy's injuries
were not "a reasonably foreseeable event given the design de-
279. Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing In re Estate of Keck, 856 P.2d 740,
743 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)).
280. Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Christen v. Lee, 780 P.2d 1307,
1321 (Wash. 1989)).
281. Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Channel v. Mills, 890 P.2d 535, 538
(Wash. Ct. App.1995)).
282. McCoy, 936 P.2d at 35 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Hartley v. State,
698 P.2d 77, 83 (Wash. 1985)).
283. Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (quoting Keck, 856 P.2d at 743 (quoting
Christen, 780 P.2d at 1321).
284. Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Hartley, 698 P.2d at 84).
285. Id. at 35-36 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Maltman v. Sauer, 530
P.2d 254, 258-59 (Wash. 1975)).
286. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
287. See McCoy, 936 P.2d at 35-36 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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fect."289 Suzuki could not foresee that due to its design defect,
McCoy would be struck by a hit-and-run driver.290
In concluding, Justice Thompson stated that the rescue
doctrine makes it clear that there must be an element of ur-
gency and need for immediate action.291 Justice Thompson
stated that at the time McCoy was injured, the element of ur-
gency had long since passed.292
On appeal by Suzuki, the Washington Supreme Court re-
viewed the summary judgment by "consider[ing] the facts in a
light most favorable to McCoy, the non-moving party, and re-
view[ed] the issues of law de novo."293 In its review, the
supreme court agreed with the appellate court that the rescue
doctrine applied, but disagreed with its holding that the rescue
doctrine varies the ordinary rules of negligence.294 Instead, the
supreme court reiterated its holding in Maltman v. Sauer,295
that a "plaintiff must still show the defendant proximately
caused his injuries."296 Furthermore, the court then discussed
the two functions of the rescue doctrine.297 First, the rescue
doctrine "informs a tortfeasor it is foreseeable a rescuer will
come to the aid of the person imperiled by the tortfeasor's ac-
tions, and, therefore, the tortfeasor owes the rescuer a duty sim-
ilar to the duty he owes the person he imperils."29 Second, "the
rescue doctrine negates the presumption that the rescuer as-
sumed the risk of injury when he knowingly undertook the dan-
gerous rescue, so long as he does not act rashly or recklessly."299
After reciting the same elements that the appellate court set
forth to qualify an individual as a rescuer, the court agreed with
the lower court's finding that McCoy "demonstrated sufficient
289. Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
290. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
291. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
292. See McCoy, 936 P.2d at 35-36 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
293. McCoy, 961 P.2d at 955.
294. See id. at 956-57.
295. 530 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1975).
296. McCoy, 961 P.2d at 956 (citing Maltman, 530 P.2d at 258-59).
297. See id.
298. Id. (citing Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y.
1921)).
299. Id. (citing Hawkins v. Palmer, 188 P.2d 121, 123 (Wash. 1947)).
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facts of rescuer status to put the issue whether he met the four
requirements set out in French to the jury."300
After concluding that the rescue doctrine applies to a prod-
ucts liability action and that a rescuer must show that the de-
fendant proximately caused his injuries, the court addressed
the issue of whether or not McCoy demonstrated that Suzuki
proximately caused his injuries.301 In doing so, the supreme
court reviewed the meaning and application of proximate
cause.30 2 It began by setting forth the two prongs of proximate
cause: (1) cause in fact; and (2) legal cause.30 3
Next, the supreme court took a close look at each of the
prongs of proximate cause and the arguments presented by Mc-
Coy and Suzuki.30 4 It stated that "[clause in fact asks whether
'there was a sufficiently close, actual, causal connection be-
tween defendant's conduct and the actual damage suffered by
plaintiff."' 30 5 The court continued that "[flor the original de-
fendant's wrongdoing to be the cause in fact of plaintiffs inju-
ries, the 'original negligence of the defendant, which placed him
in his present imperiled predicament, must be an active factor
in the course of events which ultimately culminates in injury to
the plaintiff.'" 30 6 The hit-and-run driver's intervention between
Suzuki's alleged wrongdoings and McCoy's injuries would be ex-
amined as part of the cause in fact inquiry.30 7 The supreme
court went on to reason that if the intervening cause was fore-
seeable and the defendant's wrongdoing caused the injuries,
then the defendant's wrongdoing would be the cause in fact.308
The supreme court continued that if "the intervening cause was
unforeseeable then 'it would break the causal connection be-
tween the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injury' and
300. Id. See also supra note 267.
301. See McCoy, 961 P.2d at 956-57.
302. See id. at 957.
303. See id. (citing Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc., 951 P.2d 749, 752
(Wash. 1998)).
304. See id. at 957-58.
305. Id. at 957 (quoting Maltman, 530 P.2d at 258 (quoting Rikstad v. Holm-
berg, 456 P.2d 355, 357 (Wash. 1969)).
306. McCoy, 961 P.2d at 957 (quoting Maltman, 530 P.2d at 259).
307. See id.
308. See id. (citing Maltman, 530 P.2d at 259); Schooley, 951 P.2d at 756.
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negate a finding of cause in fact."309 Before reaching the argu-
ments of McCoy and Suzuki, the court stated that "[wihether
an independent cause is reasonably foreseeable is generally a
question of fact for the jury."310 However, it also stated that it
would take the question from the jury if there was no question
that the intervening cause was "'totally unforeseeable, in a
causal sense, to the original condition attributable to the de-
fendant's conduct."' 31'
In presenting its argument, Suzuki argued that "it was to-
tally unforeseeable that a rescuer such as McCoy would be in-
jured by a third vehicle under these particular facts."312 Having
presented its argument, Suzuki asked the supreme court to rule
in its favor on the issue as a matter of law, but the court held
that the issue of foreseeability was "sufficiently close" and had
to be decided by a jury.313
In presenting his argument, McCoy cited the case of In re
Estate of Keck. 31 4 The Keck case involved a rescuer who was hit
and instantly killed while rescuing a driver who had been
drinking and was involved in an accident. 315 In its ruling, the
Washington Court of Appeals allowed the estate to bring an ac-
tion under the rescue doctrine against the person who was be-
ing rescued. 31 6 The court of appeals, in reversing the trial
court's decision, held that "it could not say as a matter of law
that the original action was not the proximate cause of the dece-
dent's injuries."317 In McCoy, the supreme court found that the
facts were similar enough to Keck that it would not take the
case from the jury.318 Additionally, the court stated that "if the
Suzuki Samurai is found to be defective the jury could find it
foreseeable that the Suzuki Samurai would roll and that an ap-
proaching car would cause injury to either those in the Suzuki
Samurai or to a rescuer, depending on the specific facts to be
309. McCoy, 961 P.2d at 957 (quoting Maltman, 530 P.2d at 259) (quoting
Qualls v. Golden Arrow Farms, Inc. 288 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wash. 1955)).
310. Id. (citing Maltman, 530 P.2d 254).
311. Id. (quoting Maltman, 530 P.2d at 259).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 856 P.2d 740 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
315. See McCoy, 961 P.2d at 957 (citing Keck, 856 P.2d at 742).
316. See id.
317. Id.
318. See id.
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proved." 319 It also noted that sister jurisdictions have reached
the same conclusion. 320
Having completed its discussion of cause in fact, the
supreme court discussed legal cause, the second prong of proxi-
mate cause.321 To begin, it noted that "[]egal cause is decided
by the court as a question of law. Legal cause rests on policy
grounds concerned with how far defendant's liability should ex-
tend."322 The court also noted that "[1]egal cause is not suscepti-
ble of a conclusive and fixed set of rules, readily formulated." 323
In expanding on its discussion of legal cause, the court quoted
King v. City of Seattle 24
[Legal liability] is always to be determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice,
policy, and precedent .... The best use that can be made of the
authorities on proximate cause is merely to furnish illustrations
of situations which judicious men upon careful consideration have
adjudged to be on one side of the line or the other.325
The court went on to describe the courts as gatekeepers
that will dismiss "an action without a trial for lack of legal
cause if a defendant's actions are too remote a cause of plain-
tiffs injuries."326 In doing so, the court held that the alleged
319. Id. at 957-58.
320. See McCoy, 961 P.2d at 958. In noting that sister jurisdictions have
reached the same conclusion under similar facts, the court discussed
Scott v. Texaco, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966), [where] a road-
side rescuer was struck by a vehicle while warning oncoming traffic of the
principal car accident. The California court held the issue of whether the
party causing the original accident proximately caused plaintiffs injuries or
whether the third vehicle constituted an independent superseding cause
'was a question for the jury to determine under proper instructions.' Id. at
785. See also Stevens v. Baggett . . ., 268 S.E.2d 370, 373 (Ga. 1980)
(whether the party that caused the original accident is liable for injuries
sustained by a nurse who was struck by an oncoming vehicle while render-
ing assistance is a jury question).
Id.
321. See id.
322. Id. (citing Hartley, 698 P.2d at 83).
323. Id. at 958 (quoting King v. City of Seattle, 525 P.2d 228, 235 (Wash.
1974) (quoting 1 THoMAs ATINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY
110 (1906).
324. 525 P.2d 228 (Wash. 1974).
325. McCoy, 961 P.2d at 958 (quoting King, 525 P.2d at 235 (quoting STREET,
supra note 323).
326. Id.
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fault of Suzuki was not so remote as to cut off liability as a mat-
ter of law.327 Instead, it affirmed the court of appeals decision
and remanded the action for trial.328
VI. Analysis
"The alleged negligence is too remote and insubstantial to impose
liability."329
Justice Thompson, 1997
In McCoy, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the ap-
pellate court's decision, which reversed the order of summary
judgment in favor of Suzuki and remanded the case for trial to
consider the existence of proximate cause.330 The supreme
court, in defining proximate cause, described cause in fact as
asking "whether 'there was a sufficiently close, actual, causal
connection between defendant's conduct and the actual damage
suffered by plaintiff.'" 331 Additionally, the court stated that the
rescue doctrine "is a reflection of societal judgment that rescu-
ers should not be barred from bringing suit for knowingly plac-
327. See id. The court went on to note cases in which the defendant's actions
were so remote that the action was dismissed for lack of legal cause:
In Maltman we dismissed the action, reasoning the party causing the princi-
pal accident should not be liable for the subsequent crash of a rescue heli-
copter hundreds of miles away because the helicopter crash was simply too
remote a result of the principal accident. In Hartley, the estate of a dece-
dent killed by a drunk driver sued the State for failing to revoke the drunk
driver's license. There we similarly dismissed reasoning the State should
not be held liable for injuries caused by a driver simply because the State
failed to revoke that driver's license. Hartley..., 698 P.2d at 86. Such fault
on the State's behalf was again too remote a cause of the ensuing injury to
impose liability.
Id.
328. See id.
329. McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 P.2d 31, 36 (Wash. App. Ct.
1997) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Hartley v. State, 698 P.2d 77, 86 (Wash.
1985) (holding that the state and county's failure to revoke a defendant's driver's
license was too remote to impose liability for wrongful death action); Klein v. City
of Seattle, 705 P.2d 806, 807 (Wash. App. Ct. 1985) (stating a design defect in road
was too remote to impose liability for accident caused by a driver who had been
drinking and was speeding)).
330. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
331. McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 961 P.2d 952, 957 (quoting
Maltman v. Sauer, 530 P.2d 254, 259 (Wash. 1975) (quoting Rikstad v. Holmberg,
456 P.2d 355, 357 (Wash. 1969)).
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ing themselves in danger to undertake a rescue."332 Apparently,
the court has not acknowledged its own phrasing-"to under-
take a rescue."333 In reviewing the court's decision, it is impor-
tant to recall the four elements required by the courts in the
State of Washington to invoke the rescue doctrine. 334 A review
of each of the elements will show that the courts' decision to
reverse the order of summary judgment in favor of Suzuki was
erroneous.
The first element required by the Washington state courts
is that "[there must be negligence on the part of the defendant
which is the proximate cause of peril, or what would appear to a
reasonable person, under the circumstances, to be peril, to the
life or limb of another."335 McCoy's initial observation and reac-
tion to the accident would meet the requirements of this ele-
ment. However, at the time that McCoy was hit, there was no
peril. The accident scene was cleared. 336 The driver and pas-
senger of the Suzuki were no longer in peril, as they had al-
ready been rescued.337  Furthermore, in following the
Derdiarian Court's reasoning, which was based upon Ven-
tricelli,338 the alleged negligence of Suzuki may have undoubt-
edly served to place McCoy at the site of the accident, but
McCoy's being hit-and-run was "divorced from and not a fore-
seeable risk associated with the original negligence."339 This
foreseeability approach would fall into the first approach to
proximate cause discussed supra.340 Even if the Suzuki Samu-
rai was found to be of a defective design, McCoy's injuries were
"not of a type reasonably to be expected."341 It is not likely that
an alleged design defect would cause a passerby, who stopped
and assisted the injured, to be struck by a car while returning to
his car after the peril ceased to exist. Since McCoy will be un-
able to prove that the driver and passenger of the Suzuki Samu-
332. Id. at 956.
333. Id.
334. See supra text accompanying note 267.
335. See supra text accompanying note 267.
336. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
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rai were still in peril at the time he was injured and that the
type of injuries he sustained were reasonably foreseeable, the
claim will fail the first element.
The second element required is that "[tihe peril, or reason-
able appearance of peril, to the life or limb of another must be
imminent."342 The word "imminent" is defined as "near at hand;
mediate rather than immediate; close rather than touching; im-
pending; on the point of happening; threatening; menacing; per-
ilous." 343 The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that in
order for the plaintiff to recover, the original negligence of the
defendant, which placed the plaintiff in imminent peril, "must
be an active factor in the course of events which ultimately
culminates in injury to the plaintiff."34 The courts in New York
follow the same "imminency" requirement. 345 A review of the
facts will show that at the time McCoy was injured, any negli-
gence on the behalf of Suzuki was no longer active. For in-
stance, at the time McCoy was injured, the peril to the driver
and passenger was no longer active. 346 Both the driver and the
passenger of the Suzuki Samurai had already been taken from
the scene by the rescue workers. 347 The Samurai had been
towed away and the state trooper had left the scene.34 8 In fact,
even McCoy was returning to his car in order to leave the
scene.
349
The third element requires that "in determining whether
the peril, or the appearance of peril, is imminent, in the sense
that an emergency exists requiring immediate action, the cir-
cumstances presented to the rescuer must be such that a rea-
sonably prudent man, under the same or similar circumstances,
would determine that such peril existed."350 The court added
that "[t]he issue of whether the rescuer's determination con-
formed with the reasonably prudent man standard is a question
342. See supra text accompanying note 267.
343. BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990).
344. Maltman, 530 P.2d at 259 (emphasis added). See also In re Estate of
Keck, 856 P.2d 740, 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
345. See Provenzo v. Sam, 244 N.E.2d 26, 28-29 (N.Y. 1968); Wagner v. Inter-
national Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921).
346. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
350. See supra text accompanying note 267.
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for the jury, under proper instructions."3 51 It can be conceded
that McCoy's determination conformed with the reasonably
prudent man standard. At the time McCoy witnessed the acci-
dent any "reasonably prudent person" would have thought the
peril to the driver and passenger was imminent. However, at
the time McCoy was injured, "any reasonably prudent person"
would have considered the emergency over, since the driver and
passenger of the Suzuki had already been rescued.352
The fourth and final element provides that "after determin-
ing that imminent peril to the life or limb of a person exists, the
rescuer, in effecting the rescue, must be guided by the standard
of reasonable care under the circumstances."353 The element
also provides that "[wihether there has been conformance with
this standard also is a question for the jury, under the proper
instructions."354 The language is clear on its face; it states "in
effecting the rescue."355 It does not mean that the person must
be reasonable walking back to his car after the accident and the
rescue occurred, but rather it means while the rescue is occur-
ring. In other words, if McCoy were to prevail under this ele-
ment, he would have to be able to show that he was hit while
attempting to rescue the driver and passenger of the Suzuki
Samurai from peril. However, since he was returning to his car
and not attempting a rescue when he was injured, he will not be
able to show that he was injured "in effecting the rescue."356
The Washington Supreme Court seems to avoid the fact
that each of the elements requires that the rescuer be acting
within the state of rescue to invoke the rescue doctrine. In its
opinion, the court stated that it would adhere to the holding in
Maltman, that it would uphold "the requirement that a rescuer
show that the defendant proximately caused his injuries, [to re-
main] with[in the] general principles of liability."357 This is con-
sistent with the New York courts' application of liability arising
351. See supra text accompanying note 267.
352. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
353. See supra text accompanying note 267.
354. See supra text accompanying note 267.
355. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
356. (emphasis removed). See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
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out of one's negligent acts.358 However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that there is a point at
which the link between the actions of a careless actor and the
damages sustained will become "too tenuous - that what is
claimed to be consequence is only fortuity."359 McCoy's injuries
fit this description. To impose liability upon Suzuki would re-
quire the court to have the accident reoccur, having McCoy
struck during his rescue of the driver and passenger of the
Suzuki. As mentioned supra, the policy behind the rescue doc-
trine is to allow rescuers to recover for injuries that occur dur-
ing the rescue and to shield them from any liability arising from
the rescue. 360 If the Washington courts allow McCoy to prevail
on remand, they will not be adhering to their own decision to
uphold the "requirement that a rescuer show the defendant
proximately caused his injuries.. .in keeping with general prin-
ciples of liability."361 Allowing McCoy to prevail would require
Suzuki to insure against fortuitous claims that fall outside the
general principles of liability. Using the words of the United
States Court of Appeals, the link between Suzuki's alleged de-
sign defect and McCoy's hit-and-run injuries is "too tenuous"
and, therefore, Suzuki should not be held liable. 362
Interestingly enough, in discussing the imminency require-
ment, the Washington Supreme Court stated that "the plain-
tiffs injury must not be the result of an intervening cause which
came into active operation after the negligence of the defendant
had ceased."363 It also reasoned that "[i]f the act itself is not
foreseeable-in other words, if the act is an intervening, effi-
cient cause-it will break the causal connection between the de-
fendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injuries."36 Is it fair to
ask whether the Suzuki's skidding on ice and spinning out of
358. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (holding
"[tihe risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk im-
ports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension"
Id. at 100.). See also Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir.
1964) (holding "foreseeability of danger is necessary to render conduct negligent").
359. Kinsman Transit Co., 33 F.2d at 725.
360. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
361. McCoy, 961 P.2d at 957.
362. Kinsman Transit Co., 33 F.2d at 725.
363. Maltman, 530 P.2d. at 259.
364. Id. (quoting Qualls v. Golden Arrow Farms, 288 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wash.
1955)).
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control was foreseeable? The answer is probably yes. However,
add the fact that the passenger grabbed the steering wheel at-
tempting to regain control, causing it to fishtail further out of
control, and the question becomes whether or not Suzuki can
reasonably foresee such an action. The answer is most likely
not. The first and second approaches to the finding of proximate
cause, discussed supra, would find proximate cause not to exist,
since both approaches allow for an unforeseeable intervening
cause to defeat a finding of proximate cause.365 The court can-
not expect Suzuki to insure against the negligent acts of a party
so far removed. Furthermore, Suzuki cannot reasonably foresee
that the particular driver in this instance, or any driver, would
hit McCoy. Even though McCoy took steps to assure that he
was noticeable (that is, of course, after the rescue took place),
while walking back to his car (holding the lit flare in his road-
side hand), he was hit by a negligent driver.366 Suzuki should
not have to protect against the negligent driving of an
individual.
Additionally consider that the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, held that "there is no liability for failure to
warn where such risks and dangers are so obvious that they can
ordinarily be appreciated by any consumer to the same extent
that a formal warning would provide.., or where they can be
recognized simply as a matter of common sense."367 When the
rollover defect in the Suzuki Samurai was discovered, it was
widely and frequently publicized on the news until the issue
subsided. The saturation of the news and marketplace with the
fact that Suzukis roll over was more than enough to put the
public on notice. It can be argued that the "public warning" be-
came a matter of common sense.
Although there is a societal feeling that rescuers should be
compensated for injuries while undertaking a rescue, there
comes a point where liability should be cut off. In determining
where to draw the line, it is apparent that the courts focus on
legal cause, and, more specifically, proximate cause. The deter-
mination of whether or not one's acts are closely connected to
365. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
367. Carbone v. Alagna, 658 N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (2d Dep't 1997) (citing Bazerman
v. Gardall Safe Corp., 609 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1st Dep't 1994)).
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another's injuries works to protect both the defendant and the
plaintiff. This is so because it will work to compensate a plain-
tiff for any injuries sustained, and to protect a defendant from
claims that are "too tenuous."368 This analysis has shown, by
way of an application of the four elements required to invoke
the rescue doctrine in the State of Washington, 36 9 that a correct
determination would work to protect Suzuki by cutting off
liability.
VII. Conclusion
"The court did not err by granting Suzuki's motion for summary
judgment."370
Justice Thompson, 1997
Although the question of proximate cause is typically a
question for the jury, as are some of the elements of the rescue
doctrine, there are cases where proximate cause is so tenuous
that they should not be sent to a jury. Such cases will only work
against judicial economy. However, it should be noted that the
purpose of this article is not to say that an application of the
rescue doctrine to a products liability claim should never occur.
It simply stands for the idea that when proximate cause is not
established or is "too tenuous,"371 the action should not go for-
ward. As mentioned, the policy considerations behind proxi-
mate cause are to limit the liability arising from one's negligent
conduct.372 In Codling v. Paglia,373 the New York Court of Ap-
peals discussed the importance of the availability of useful, non-
defective products.374 In doing so, it mentioned that by impos-
ing the economic burden of financial losses of nonusers upon the
manufacturer, the manufacturers will have an incentive "to
turn out useful, attractive, but safe products."375 However, the
court continued by noting that in return, the purchase price of a
368. Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d at 725.
369. See supra text accompanying note 267.
370. McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 P.2d 31, 36 (Wash. App. Ct.
1997).
371. Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d at 725.
372. See supra note 207-10 and accompanying text.
373. 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).
374. See id. at 627.
375. Id. at 628.
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particular unit will increase, and that it should be acceptable to
consumers if they are given the added protection.37 6 Is this rea-
sonable? Most likely yes, but the courts should not allow claims
which are "too tenuous" 377 to place a financial burden upon au-
tomobile manufacturers and consumers.
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